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Frontiers in Microeconomics: Game Theory

Lecturer: Professor Zvika Neeman, PhD (Tel-Aviv University)
Date: September 19 – September 22, 2016
Venue: Leipzig University, Faculty of Economics and Management Science, Grimmaische Straße 12, 04109 Leipzig, seminar room 16
Registration: until September 1, 2016 via e-mail: sprenger@wifa.uni-leipzig.de

Announcement see pdf

Lecture Notes see pdf

Course outline
The course provides a short introduction to game theory. Topics covered include normal and extensive form games, with complete and incomplete information, as well as more advanced topics such as sequential rationality, auctions, revenue equivalence, the winner’s curse, mechanism design, and reputation. Many examples, both abstract and more applied will be presented.

Course requirements
written exam

Prerequisites
The course is self contained. Basic knowledge of probability and calculus is assumed.

Tentative Lecture Plan
Monday (19/9) Strategic Form Games

09:30–10:45    Lecture 1: Dominant Strategies
11:00–12:15    Lecture 2: Successive Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies
14:00–15:15    Lecture 3: Nash Equilibrium
15:45–17:00    Lecture 4: Existence of Nash Equilibrium

Tuesday (20/9) Extensive Form Games

09:30–10:45   Lecture 5: Backwards Induction
11:00–12:15    Lecture 6: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
14:00–15:15    Lecture 7: Alternating Offer Bargaining
15:45–17:00    Lecture 8: Repeated Games

Wednesday (21/9) Games with Incomplete Information 1
09:30–10:45   Lecture 9: Sequential Rationality
11:00–12:15    Lecture 10: Bayesian Games
14:00–15:15    Lecture 11: Auctions with Private Values
15:45–17:00    Lecture 12: Revenue Equivalence

Thursday (22/9) Games with Incomplete Information 2
09:30–10:45   Lecture 13: The Winner’s Curse
11:00-12:15     Lecture 14: Mechanism Design: Bilateral Trade
14:00–15:15    Lecture 15: Good Reputation
15:45–17:00    Lecture 16: Bad Reputation